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REMARKS ON INTERVENTION
Juan E. Méndez†
TRANSCRIPT:
I am very grateful to the Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law for the invitation to speak at this important conference. It is a great 
pleasure to be here today in front of such a distinguished audience.
My presentation will concentrate on the importance of the preven-
tion of mass violence and international crimes, including genocide, and I 
will do so mainly from the perspectives of International Center for Transi-
tional Justice (ICTJ) programs in several countries, and from my experience 
as the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Geno-
cide.
Breaking the cycle of impunity and fostering accountability is a 
crucial component in the prevention of future violence and mass atrocities: 
no prevention efforts can take place without a serious attempt to break the 
cycle of impunity for past human rights violations, especially if they are so 
widespread or systematic as to constitute war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, or genocide. If perpetrators feel shielded from prosecution or investiga-
tion for the crimes they have already committed, they will have an incentive 
not only to commit them anew, but also to raise the stakes and perpetrate 
crimes that are even more serious. The failure to do justice to the victims 
usually leads to sentiments of revenge, and thus to the likelihood of more 
crimes. Accountability is essential to halt the vicious cycle of revenge, but 
also to enable the victims to make their own decisions as to their protection 
and well being, so that they are not merely passive recipients of the interna-
  The Frederick K. Cox International Law Center sponsored the symposium “To Prevent 
and to Punish: An International Conference in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary 
of the Negotiation of the Genocide Convention,” a conference drawing renowned interna-
tional law scholars to Case Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio 
on September 28, 2007 to share their expert analysis of the origins of the Genocide Conven-
tion and its future potential. A webcast of the Conference is available at 
http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=20070928. The foregoing is a transcript of 
Mr. Méndez’s remarks from this conference.  
 †  President of the International Center for Transitional Justice and Former Special Advi-
sor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the contributions of his ICTJ colleagues, Marieke Wierda, Cecile Aptel, and Richard 
Bailey, and of his former colleagues at the United Nations, Ekkehard Strauss and Andres 
Salazar. 
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tional community’s efforts. Finally, accountability for past crimes is also 
important so that the victims, their families, and their communities can dis-
tinguish between their victimizers and the communities the victimizers 
claimed to represent, so that the blame for the atrocities is not visited on 
innocent descendants of those perpetrators.  
It must be understood, however, that prevention of genocide will 
require more and different measures; bringing the perpetrators to justice will 
not be enough. Prevention of genocide will require early warning and rea-
sonable suggestions for early action. The office I held for thirty months at 
the request of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Anan was the first 
attempt by the United Nations to apply lessons learned and correct the struc-
tural weaknesses that caused the United Nations to fail to prevent genocides 
in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s.  
As a very preliminary observation, my experience demonstrates that 
early warning and early action can serve important purposes; still, the bot-
tleneck is the political will to act that is almost never present from the start. 
In that sense, the role of the Special Advisor is—I think—primarily directed 
to contribute to, shape, and create that political will, in conjunction with 
public opinion, caring institutions, and willing democratic States. I am also 
glad to report that, following a strong report from the Advisory Committee 
on Prevention of Genocide (which I continue to be a member of), the new 
Secretary-General has created the position of full time Special Advisor and 
named the distinguished jurist Francis Deng to the post. In addition to his 
full-time duties, he will be assigned more resources and his job will be ele-
vated to the rank of Under-Secretary-General. The latter is crucial to ensure 
direct contact with Secretary-General Ban and through him to the Security 
Council, since the latter is—through its Resolution 1366 of 2001—the 
source of the Special Advisor’s mandate.1
The task enjoys great legitimacy because of the Convention to Pre-
vent and Punish the Crime of Genocide, of 1948, has become jus cogens. In 
addition, the Outcome Report of the 2005 Summit offered an additional 
source of legitimacy to prevention of genocide in the form of the adoption 
of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.2 Nevertheless, both sources of 
legal and moral support are, unfortunately, qualified. In the case of the Ge-
nocide Convention, disputes over the definition of genocide and about 
whether the facts on the ground constitute genocide have often become a 
substitute for serious action. In our activities, we had to frequently stress 
that our task was to prevent, not to adjudicate; it follows that my office was 
1 S.C. Res. 1366, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1366 (Aug. 30, 2001); see also Letter from Kofi A. 
Annan, Secretary-General to the Security Council Announcing Appointment of the Special 
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, July 12, 2004 (S/2004/567).
2 G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 138–40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
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not called upon to make such a judgment, but rather to generate action be-
fore all the elements of the definition were in place. For that reason, it was 
imperative to act on situations of mass violence against vulnerable popula-
tions defined by their ethnicity, race, religion, or national origin, whether or 
not the attacks amounted to genocide, and to let a court of law eventually 
decide what the attacks were. With respect to Responsibility to Protect, re-
gretfully there are now many revisionist theories about what the relevant 
documents meant to say.3 Some States express distrust, maintaining that 
Responsibility to Protect is just a new catchphrase for humanitarian inter-
vention and, therefore, a rationalization for super-power non-consensual 
interventions. That this debate is hampering the creation of relevant offices 
in the Secretariat to operationalize the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is a 
clear indication that there is still a lot to be done in the battle of ideas. 
In terms of early action, the challenge is to come up with sugges-
tions that are practical and not just token gestures. In that sense, non-
consensual military intervention should never be absolutely ruled out be-
cause in some cases it will be the only way to save lives. Nevertheless, be-
fore advocating the use of force we must be certain that we are not going to 
do more harm than good; this is always contingent on the facts on the 
ground and their context. Between doing nothing and invading, there is a 
wide spectrum of actions that can and should be taken on a timely basis. In 
my experience, primarily relating to Darfur, but extrapolating it to other 
situations as well, I have learned that effective prevention must rely on act-
ing simultaneously and in a concerted way in four areas: (1) physical pro-
tection of the population at risk, (2) humanitarian relief, (3) promoting 
peace talks to end the underlying conflict, and (4) breaking the cycle of im-
punity for the crimes already committed. I stress that in each of these areas 
the actions must change and be adapted to evolving circumstances. More 
importantly, they should be implemented simultaneously and in coordina-
tion, and we should not allow them to become a vicious circle, like in Dar-
fur, where each one of these actions are so dependent on obtaining consent 
for the other that they are never fully implemented. In keeping with the 
theme of this conference, I would like to concentrate on preventive action.  
Accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity must be 
comprehensive, balanced, and holistic, meaning that policies and practices 
must address the need to discover and disclose the truth, to bring perpetra-
tors to justice, to offer reparations to the victims, and to promote deep re-
forms in the institutions through which State power is exercised. In cases 
where the violence has clear ethnic dimensions, like in Darfur, practices 
must be accompanied by reconciliation initiatives aimed at fostering serious 
inter-communal conversation, without outside interference, about return to 
3 Id.
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homes and villages, property restitution, water, grazing, and passage rights. 
While criminal prosecutions should not be the sole response to impunity, 
there is no doubt that prosecutions must play a central, indispensable role in 
any policy of accountability. 
Prosecutions also represent the State’s fundamental obligation to 
give victims access to justice. In addition, concerning international crimes, 
States have a clear international legal obligation to ensure that justice is 
done. This is particularly the case for serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law. In relation to war crimes, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and Additional Protocol I establish a duty for States to prosecute and punish 
those responsible for “grave breaches” of international humanitarian law. 
Although it was once understood that the category of “grave breaches” ap-
plied to international conflicts only, a customary international law norm is 
emerging that also applies it to conflicts that are not international.4 If a State 
Party is unwilling or unable to prosecute war criminals, it must hand them 
over to be prosecuted by another State Party (under the aut dedere aut judi-
care principle). In the post World War II era, therefore, international huma-
nitarian law created a new set of obligations, which paved the way for the 
enforcement of these norms.  
To foster accountability for such crimes, a dual approach should be 
favored. On the one hand, the international community must pay more at-
tention to helping States live up to this obligation by building independent, 
impartial judiciaries that can prosecute mass atrocities with full respect for 
due process of law and fair trial guarantees. On the other, our support of the 
role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international or 
hybrid criminal jurisdictions must be oriented towards supplementing the 
absence of will or capacity to produce fair trials domestically, but also to 
help generate that capacity in the near future. 
This year we celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of the 1907 
Hague Rules,5 as well as the thirtieth anniversary of the 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.6 In the seventy years that elapsed 
between these two documents (from 1907 to 1977), the world suffered 
world wars, the Holocaust and other genocides, and many terrible war 
crimes. But these years have also marked the codification of the body of 
international humanitarian law, the materialization of the principle of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility at the international level, and the strengthen-
ing of all forms of accountability for these crimes. The near-universal ratifi-
4 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (2001). 
5 THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 1 (James Brown Scott 
ed., 1915). 
6 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 4. 
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cation of the Geneva Convention bears witness to this reinforcement of in-
ternational law, particularly international humanitarian law. 
If we only look back less than fifteen years ago, we see how far we 
have come from the pervasiveness of impunity for grave human rights 
crimes and from the permissive attitude towards that impunity by the inter-
national community. Since 1993, we have notably witnessed the establish-
ment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, and other hybrid mechanisms in East Timor, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and, most recently, Lebanon and Guatemala. 
Important too are efforts to prosecute these crimes on the domestic level in 
Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. The creation of the ICC 
in 1998 was the high point of this evolution, signaling that accountability 
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide is now paramount. 
The Rome Statute is not only the culmination of a clear historical trend, it is 
also the means to establish an instrument that makes justice possible when 
the national domestic jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to afford it. Yet, 
for each situation in which the ICC has acquired jurisdiction, we hear voices 
calling for amnesty, withdrawal of indictments, or other forms of exercising 
discretion and avoiding prosecutions, supposedly in the name of peace.7
With the best of intentions, some are urging measures that implicit-
ly give in to the blackmail of the parties to the armed conflict—peace can 
only come if those accused of atrocities are given guarantees that they will 
not be touched. We are concerned by the revival of this debate that some of 
us had hoped would be more settled by now. To those who have followed 
the evolution of human rights in the last twenty-five years, the debate rings 
of earlier discussions as to whether fragile democracies could really afford 
to investigate and disclose, let alone prosecute, the major crimes of the pre-
ceding era. The alleged antinomy between justice and democracy, often 
rephrased today as the tension between peace and justice, is debated in aca-
demic circles and among practitioners. Recently, the International Center 
for Transitional Justice co-organized a conference in Nuremberg to discuss 
this tension and to explore possible ways in which peace and justice indeed 
can be mutually reinforcing.8
7 See, e.g., Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, Point of No Re-
turn: Taking Stock of One Year of Cessation of Hostilities in Northern Uganda, Press Re-
lease, THE NEW VISION, Sept. 5, 2007, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/526/532/ 
584977.
8 Building a Future on Peace and Justice, http://www.peace-justice-conference.info/ 
conference_process.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2007) (the conference which took place in Nu-
remberg between June 25–27, 2007, was organized by the Federal Republic of Germany, 
represented by the Foreign Office (in cooperation with the Ministry for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development), the Republic of Finland, represented by the Ministry of Foreign 
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In Northern Uganda, while there is broad recognition that the ICC 
arrest warrants have assisted in bringing the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
to the negotiating table, some have portrayed these warrants as obstacles to 
progressing further with the peace process. We believe, however, that the 
warrants act as an incentive to keeping the LRA involved in the peace talks. 
We also welcome the signature of an Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation by the LRA and the Government of Uganda on June 29, 
2007.9 The Agreement proposes that Uganda should implement its interna-
tional obligations to prosecute senior leaders of the LRA under national law. 
Depending on what is proposed to implement it, and what is effectively 
done, we believe this course of action may be consistent with the Rome 
Statute. A thorough national accountability process, respecting international 
standards, could have a wide-reaching impact in Ugandan society. We be-
lieve the robust approach taken in this preliminary peace agreement to ac-
countability is an important improvement over past peace accords, and that 
the pressure brought to bear by the ICC has assisted to achieve this. At the 
same time, the international community must stand ready to continue its 
support of the ICC if either side reneges on the agreement. 
There are many examples of the impact that prosecutions—or even 
the threat of prosecutions—have in preventing crimes, including war 
crimes.  
In Cote d’Ivoire, the potential for ICC prosecution of those who 
used hate speech to instigate and incite others to commit international 
crimes has arguably kept those actors under some level of control. It is also 
an important example of the possible preventive role of the ICC.10
In Colombia, alternative sentencing and demobilization of the pa-
ramilitary groups under the Justice and Peace Law as originally drafted 
would have left victims with no prospect of justice for the harms they suf-
fered. The need to offer a semblance of compliance with the international 
standards set forth in the Rome Statute produced important amendments 
during the legislative process, then further strengthened by a Constitutional 
Court ruling based precisely on the need to bring the law in line with the 
Affairs, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, represented by the Foreign Ministry, Crisis Man-
agement Initiative (CMI), and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)).  
9 See Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Sudan, June 29, 2007, 
available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/67 
E010EE747704AAC125730D002BF1E7/$file/Reconciliation.pdf.  
10 Press Release, Statement by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (Nov. 
15, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/westafrica/mendez-15nov2004. 
htm.
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State’s international law obligations.11 While the Justice and Peace Law as 
amended shows important innovations, it also shows some of the tremend-
ous challenges in dealing with large numbers of perpetrators and victims 
through a system that encourages cooperation with the law and disclosure as 
an alternative to full-fledged trials.  
In Darfur, which I visited in 2004 and 2005 in my role as Special 
Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, impunity 
for earlier crimes, notably the massacres of 2003 that cost 200,000 lives, has 
been for too long a factor of instability and a hindrance to the prevention of 
future crimes. That is why I quickly joined those who called for a referral of 
the case to the ICC by the Security Council, a measure of historic signific-
ance that was adopted on April 1, 2005.12   
Unfortunately, I come away with the impression that we were not 
always strategic or sufficiently persistent in pursuing a multi-pronged ap-
proach to protection, humanitarian assistance, promoting a peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict, and criminal accountability. It has now been over two-
and-a-half years since the Security Council referral to the ICC, and the 
Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it does not recognize it and 
that it will not cooperate with the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s investiga-
tions or the arrest warrants issued this year against Ahmad Harun and Ali 
Kushayb.13 In that long period, the Security Council has made no effort to 
remind Sudan’s government that this was a decision adopted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter, and is therefore binding on all States. Instead, we have 
let the regime get away with defiance of a resolution adopted in furtherance 
of international peace and security. As far as I can see, only the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights and my office have raised this point from time 
to time. The result is not only that we do not offer the ICC the support it 
needs, but also that we have given away cards that we could have used in 
negotiating with Khartoum to better protect and assist the three million Dar-
furi people who are now totally dependent on international assistance, and 
to reach a serious peace agreement.  
Furthermore, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) re-
ports of crimes are still surfacing. Many crimes are still being committed, 
particularly against women and girls, in a widespread manner, notably in the 
Kivus. The fight against impunity has barely started in this huge country. 
11 Ley 975, de 25 de Julio de 2005, Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia 
No. C-370/2006 (in response to a challenge to Law 975 by several civil society 
organizations). 
12 See SAPG’s Note to the Secretary-General, “The Situation in Darfur/Sudan,” Dec. 12, 
2004; Juan E. Mendez, Action is Needed to Respond the Darfur Crisis, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2005; S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
13 International Criminal Court, Warrants of Arrest for the Minister of State for Humanita-
rian Affairs of Sudan, and a leader of the Militia/Janjaweed, THE HAGUE, May 2, 2007. 
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We hope that the ICC trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo14 will be followed by 
other cases, so as to give an account of the many horrific crimes committed 
in this country since 2002. There is also an acute need in the DRC to foster 
accountability for the many crimes committed before 2002. It is critical that 
domestic courts are enabled and empowered to try those responsible, includ-
ing those bearing the highest level of responsibility. The ICTJ is currently 
co-undertaking a survey to better understand the extent to which people 
have been victimized in the DRC. Another project that will pave the way to 
fostering accountability in the DRC has been developed by the U.N. Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights with the U.N. Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo; the project involves the mapping of the 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and of massive human 
rights violations that have taken place in the DRC over the last few years. 
Such mapping will not only gather and preserve crucial evidence, but will 
also provide a new impetus to advocacy for the need to bring those respon-
sible to justice. The long-term stability of this vast country situated in the 
heart of Africa is at stake, and much more needs to be done to ensure that 
the plight of the Congolese is addressed in accountability terms. 
What all of these cases demonstrate is that, ultimately, the interests 
of justice and the interests of peace cannot and should not be divorced. Jus-
tice is an important component of the prevention of future crimes. Justice 
and enforcement of the law are the only ways to build long-term respect for 
the rule of law. 
This provides us with an important lesson for all international and 
hybrid jurisdictions: they must seek more pro-actively to build their legiti-
macy in affected regions, to build their own relevance in the lives of those 
most affected. Most importantly, these jurisdictions are judged based on 
their impartiality and professionalism. Any perception of selective prosecu-
tion not based on rational choices should be avoided or at least carefully 
explained in order to be seen as legitimate and respectful of universal stan-
dards.
Those of us who support these jurisdictions should learn to identify 
their impact and successes in ways that go beyond the strict confines of the 
judicial process. In cases such as Cambodia, this will depend on the legiti-
macy and transparency of the Extraordinary Chambers in the eyes of both 
the Cambodians who suffered under the Khmer Rouge and the international 
community. This broader impact is all the more important for those interna-
tional or hybrid jurisdictions, which are being prompted to “complete” their 
work in the coming years. It is time to assess their work, but we must do it 
14 Mike Corder, Congo Militia Leader Ordered to Stand Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 
2007; Emma Thomasson, Global Court Ready for First Trial of Congo Suspect, WASH. POST
(Jan. 29, 2007).
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under a long-term view and not based on their immediate political effect on 
the ground. It is important to review their legacy and what remains to be 
done, with a view to help generate incorporation and ownership of that leg-
acy by the national legal culture, and domestic capacity to further their 
work.
Bringing justice to the leaders, those who bear the greatest respon-
sibility in the commission of international crimes, is of paramount impor-
tance. Even heads of States are not beyond the reach of the law. These prin-
ciples are reflected throughout international humanitarian law and the rule 
on command responsibility, and in the fact that the official position of indi-
viduals does not relieve them of criminal responsibility. 
Of essential importance too is the need to continue to support do-
mestic actors as they seek to bring justice outside the spotlight of interna-
tional attention or through the medium of the U.N. In this respect, I want to 
mention again important efforts in places such as Peru and Argentina, as 
well as the groundbreaking precedent established by the Supreme Court of 
Chile in ruling in favor of the extradition of former Peruvian President Al-
berto Fujimori.15
The conduct of modern wars affects greater numbers of innocent 
victims than ever before, and so greater than ever is the importance of con-
demning breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against hu-
manity, and finding ways to enforce these norms. Nevertheless, one must 
recognize that preventing violations of international humanitarian law is an 
ideal that may never be fully attained. Justice, accountability, and punish-
ment play important preventive functions, but they should not be overesti-
mated. The fact that murders have been prosecuted domestically for centu-
ries has not resulted in the cessation of murders. The fear that individuals 
have of possibly being punished may have a deterrent effect if it is corre-
lated with the likelihood of being punished. This correlation may be one of 
the fundamental problems of international justice: it is not yet systematic, 
and there are still too many ways to escape it. This, in turn, shows the im-
portance of the complementarity approach: the need to foster accountability 
at both the domestic and the international levels, so that they ultimately 
reinforce each other.  
Thank you very much for your attention. 
15 CNN, Chile: Fujimori Can Be Extradited, CNN ONLINE, Sept. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/09/21/chile.fujimori/index.html. 
